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RETENTION OF A CHECK: PAYOR BANK'S LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 4-302
The American business community utilizes checks/ as the primary
means of transferring funds. 2 Approximately fifty million checks are handled
in the United States during the course of a single business day, 3 and the
Federal Reserve System annually handles an estimated 4.7 trillion checks
of which 99.5% are paid in due course.` Because of the interstate nature
of American business, the vast volume of items 2 handled by banks and the
large percentage of these items that pass for collection and payment across
state lines, there is a need for uniform legislation which can be consistently
applied and understood. Articles .3 and 4 of the Code were promulgated to
meet this need. Article 3 of the Code, entitled Commercial Paper, concerns
the handling of negotiable instruments. Article 4 of the Code, which super-
sedes Article 3 in the area of bank collection and deposits concerns the
practice set up for handling the huge volume of checks processed by the
banking community. A purpose of Article 4 is to aid the flow of items
passing for collection and payment, 6 and a means of aiding this flow is to
insure the rapid processing of these items. A small but important part of
this process is the action taken by the payor banki in paying, dishonorings
or returning the item, for this action determines whether the person who
U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (b) defines a "check" as "a draft drawn on a bank and payable
on demand." Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code
are to the 1962 Official Text.
2 See, e.g., Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 331 (1965).
3 Id. at 333 n.6. There appears to be no official pronouncement as to the volume of
checks handled or processed in this country. U.C.C. § 4-103, Comment 3 states that banks
handle 25 million items every business day. Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works—
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How. D.J. 71, 73 (1965) states that 50
million checks are handled a day.
4
 Leary, supra note 2, at 333 nn. 6 & 7. Owen, Jr., Article 4—Bank Deposits and
Collections, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 65, n.1 (1965) states:
The 99.5% figure is one that has been quoted for years by bankers and
writers on banking matters. The Denver branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City recently indicated the figure is still accurate as to Denver clear-
, ings. Returned check tabulations by a large Denver bank for the week of Sep-
tember 30-October 6, 1965, showed an average daily "short check" rate of only
.46%.
5 U.C.C. § 4-104(g) defines "item" as "any instrument for the payment of money
even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."
6
 U.C.C. § 4-101, Comment states that with the huge volume of checks flowing back
and forth across the country "a proper situation exists for uniform rules that will state
in modern concepts at least some of the rights of the parties and in addition aid this
flow and not interfere with its progress."
7
 U.C.C. I 4-105(b) defines the "payor hank" as "a bank by which an item is pay-
able as drawn or accepted."
U.C.C. § 3-507(1) provides that an instrument is dishonored when:
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and due acceptance or
payment is refused or cannot be obtained within the prescribed time or in
the case of bank collections the instrument is seasonably returned by the
midnight deadline (Section 4-301) ; or
(b) presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly accepted or paid.
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deposited the check will receive payment and thus fulfills the purpose for
which the check was drawn. 9 Section 4-301 allows a payor bank to revoke a
settlement 1° or credit if it returns the check by its midnight deadline. 11 If
the payor bank does not revoke the settlement in the time and manner pro-
vided by section 4-301 the payor bank becomes accountable 12 for the amount
of the item as provided by section 4-302. The payor bank becomes account-
able regardless of whether the item is properly payable13 or whether actual
damages result from the bank's inaction. If the payor bank becomes account-
able under section 4-302 the holder" can take action against the bank for
the full amount of the item. Thus, section 4-302 requires rapid action by
the payor bank. The purpose of this comment is to trace the derivation of
section 4-302 and to analyze its effectiveness in light of the commercial
circumstances in which it must be employed.
In order that the effect of section 4-302's operation may be fully under-
stood, it must be considered in terms of the bank collection process. 15 Rele-
vant aspects of the bank collection process can best be shown by way of a
hypothetical situation. A bill owed by the Castor Tire Company to the
Pollux Suppliers, Inc. is paid by a check drawn by Castor 1 " on its account
in the First National Bank. 17 Pollux18 deposits the check in the Second
Savings Bank, 11) which sends the check for collection to the First National
Bank. It can either send the check directly 2° or through one or a chain of
Since a check is an instrument for the payment of money, if a check is dishonored
and returned it will not be paying the money which it represents, and, therefore, will not
be fulfilling its purpose.
111 U.C.C. § 4-104(j) defines "settle" as "to pay in cash, by clearing house settlement,
in a charge or credit or by remittance, or otherwise as instructed. A settlement may be
either provisional or final."
11 U.C.C. § 4-104(h) defines "midnight deadline" as "midnight on its next banking
day following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from
which the time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later."
12 See Rock Island Auction Sales v. Empire Packing Co., 32 111. 2d 269, 204 N.E.2d
721 (1965) for its holding on the word "accountable" discussed infra.
13 U.C.C. § 4-104(i) defines "properly payable" as "includfing1 the availability of
funds for payment at the time of decision to pay or dishonor."
14 U.C.C. § 1-201(20) defines "holder" as "a person who is in possession of a docu-
ment of title or an instrument or investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or
to his order or to bearer or in blank."
15 For a greater coverage of the bank collection process see H. Bailey, The Law of
Bank Checks, 179-181 (3d ed. 1962) ; Leary, supra note 2; Malcolm, supra note 3.
16 The Castor Company is the drawer of the check. The Code does not define the
term "drawer." An early case defined a check as "a written request by one person who is
called the drawer, directed to •another person called the drawee, requesting him to pay to
a third person, called the payee a certain sum of money therein specified . . . ." West-
minster Bank v. Wheaton, 4 R.I. 30, 33 (1856).
17 The First National Bank is the payor bank. For a definition of payor bank see
note 7 supra.
18 The Pollux Company is the payee. The "payee" of a check is the individual who
is intended by the drawer to be the recipient of the money. Schweitzer v. Bank of Amer-
ica Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 42 Cal. App. 2d 536, 542, 109 P.2d 441, 445 (1941).
111 The Second Savings Bank is the depositary bank. U.C.C. § 4-105(a) defines "de-
positary bank" as "the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection even
though it is also the payor bank."
20 Direct routing is expressly authorized by U.C.C. § 4-204(2) (a).
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collecting banks," each forwarding the check and each receiving a provi-
sional settlement for the amount of the check. At the end of this chain is
the First National Bank, the payor bank. The last collecting bank, on
presenting22 the check to the First National Bank, receives a provisional
settlement from the First. The First National Bank has until midnight of
the day of receipt to make the provisional settlement and until its midnight
deadline to pay, return or dishonor the check. If it pays the check it posts
a debit to the account of the Castor Company, 23 and when it fails to return
the check by the same route by which it arrived all the credits and debits
between the intermediary banks become final." If it decides to dishonor the
check the First National Bank returns the check to the intermediary bank,"
thus revoking all settlements, and sends out a notice of dishonor to the
Castor Company. 2° Section 4-302 operates when the First National Bank
does not make a settlement on the day it receives the item from the last
collecting bank, or does not pay, return or dishonor the item by its midnight
deadline, as, for example, if the First merely retains the item for several
days without taking action on it. Section 4-302 provides that:
In the absence of a valid defense such as breach of a presentment
warranty (subsection (1) of Section 4-207), settlement effected or
the like, if an item is presented on and received by a payor bank
the bank is accountable for the amount of
(a) a demand item other than a documentary draft whether prop-
erly payable or not if the bank, in any case where it is not
also the depositary bank, retains the item beyond midnight of
the banking day of receipt without settling for it or, regardless
21 U.C.C. § 4-105(d) defines "collecting bank" as "any bank handling the item for
collection except the payor bank."
22 U.C.C. § 3-504(1) defines "presentment" as "a demand for acceptance or payment
made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the holder."
23 U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c) provides that "an item is finally paid by a payor bank when
the bank has done any of the following, whichever happens first ....
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith...."
24 U.C.C. § 4-213(2) provides:
If provisional settlement for an item between the presenting and payor banks is
made through a clearing house or by debits or credits in an account between
them, then to the extent that provisional debits or credits for the item are entered
in accounts between the presenting and payor banks or between the presenting
and successive prior collecting banks seriatim, they become final upon final pay-
ment of the item by the payor bank.
25 U.C.C. § 4-105(c) defines "intermediary bank" as "any bank to which an item is
transferred in course of collection except the depositary or payor bank."
26 U.C.C. § 4-301(1) provides:
Where an authorized settlement for a demand item (other than a documentary
draft) received by a payor bank otherwise than for immediate payment over the
counter has been made before midnight of the banking day of receipt the payor
bank may revoke the settlement and recover any payment if before it has made
final payment (subsection (1) of Section 4-213) and before its midnight dead-
line it
(a) returns the item; or
(b) sends written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if the item is held for
protest or is otherwise unavailable for return.
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of whether it is also the depositary bank, does not pay or
return the item or send notice of dishonor until after its mid-
night deadline; or
(b) any other properly payable item unless within the time allowed
for acceptance or payment of that item the bank either accepts
or pays the item or returns it and accompanying documents.
In this case the First National Bank would be accountable to the Pollux
Company" whether or not the Castor Company had funds" in its account
to cover the check.2°
The policy underlying section 4-302 can best be understood after an
analysis of the earlier relevant laws. At common law the drawee could be
liable for conversion of an instrument if after acceptance 3° and demand it
refused to return the instrument. For a drawee to be liable at common law
in an action of tortious conversion there had to be a demand by the holder
and an acceptance by the drawee." Destruction or retention of an item
did not amount to acceptance at common law, and mere retention, even for
an unreasonable time, did not render the drawee liable as acceptor of the
instrument. Thus, at common law, checks could be held for long periods of
time before they were deemed to have been accepted, and therefore, before
payment could be received.
As commerce and trade developed and more and more checks passed
for collection across state lines, the need became apparent for a uniform
act governing bills of exchange, notes and checks.32 In 1896 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws sponsored the Uniform
Negotiable Instrument Act (U.N.I.A.), which was ultimately enacted by
all of the states." The question of whether a drawee is liable for mere
retention of an item has been answered in two conflicting ways under the
The U.N.I.A. allowed the drawee twenty-four hours to decide
whether to accept an item. 34 Section 137 of the U.N.I.A. provided that if
27 U.C.C. § 4-201 provides that the collecting banks are agents of the owner of the
item. Thus the payor bank would not be accountable to the collecting bank but to the
owner of the item, in this case to the Pollux Company.
28 U.C.C. § 4-302 (a) applies whether or not the item is properly payable.
20 A payee of a dishonored check is required to exercise with reasonable promptness
its election to hold the payor bank liable for failure to return the check within the time
allotted. In Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Pure Ice & Cold Storage Co., 415 S.W.2d 897
(Tex. 1967), the payee did not elect to hold the drawee liable until after two years, and
thus the court held that the payee could not then collect.
so U.C.C.	 3-410(1) defines "acceptance" as "the drawee's signed engagement to
honor the draft as presented. It must be written on the draft, and may consist of his
signature alone. It becomes operative when completed by delivery or notification."
31 In Jeune v. Ward, 106 Eng. Rep. 240 (K.B. 1818), a bill was left for acceptance
and was retained by the drawee for 41 days, after which he destroyed it. The court held
that it was the duty of the party leaving it to inquire. The court held also that destruction
does not constitute acceptance. The court mentioned that for the drawee to be liable on a
bill there would have to be a conversion making him liable in an action of trover. See 2
New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 457
(1955) ; see also W. Britton, Bills and Notes 830 (1943).
32 H. Bailey, The Law of Bank Checks 5 (3d ed. 1962).
33 Id.
31 	§ 136 allows 24 hours for a payor bank to decide whether to accept an
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the drawee refused to return the item within twenty-four hours the drawee
would be deemed to have accepted the item 35
 The majority of jurisdictions36
accepted the view that retention constitutes acceptance." In State Bank v.
Weissas and Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank," two cases that were decided under
the U.N.I.A., it was held that presentation for acceptance is a demand for
acceptance which implies a demand for return and that a mere failure to return
the bill within twenty-four hours is an acceptance, thus rendering the drawee
liable on the item. The opinion of the Wisner case states that prior to the
U.N.I.A., the theory of implied or verbal acceptance applied, wherein the
liability of the drawee was not determined by any fixed rule or standard, but
by whether a jury found the drawee's conduct to amount to an implied accept-
ance. The court in the Wisner case held that the U.N.I.A. abolished the implied
acceptance and left only actual acceptance. The court held that actual accept-
ance under the U.N.I.A. can occur in only two ways: written acceptance, as
under section 1324" of the U.N.I.A., and actual acceptance under section
137. The court explained that the U.N.I.A.'s purpose was to protect the
holder, but that if the holder were required to make a demand for the re-
turn of an item he was not protected. An underlying purpose of the Weiss
and Wisner decisions was to effect the prompt and rapid return of checks.
If the payor bank could retain checks without liability, the entire bank
collection processes would be slowed down. A contrary result was reached
in Westberg v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co.'" where the court applied the
doctrine of constructive acceptance, in that if the drawee retains the item
for over twenty-four hours the question of whether his action constitutes
constructive acceptance is a jury question. Mere retention is not sufficient.
The court stated that constructive acceptance is determined in only two
ways: first, on a quasi-contractual basis, in that by custom or otherwise
the drawee knows that his retention implies acceptance; and second, on a
basis of a tortious conversion, in that the drawee's conduct is such that it
constitutes a conversion of the item. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
fames,42 another case relying on the doctrine of constructive acceptance,
instrument. If there is a deferred posting statute the payor bank has until its midnight
deadline. See H. Bailey, supra note 32, at 279.
35 U.N.I.A. § 137 provides: "Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for accept-
ance destroys the same, or refuses within 24 hours after such delivery, or within such other
period as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or not accepted to the holder,
he will be deemed to have accepted the same."
36 The following states have cases representing the majority view: California, Colo-
rado, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Tennessee and Texas. F. Beutel, Brennan's Negotiable Instruments Law 1249 (7th ed.
1948).
37 For an annotation on this subject see Annot., 63 A.L.R. 1138 (1929).
38 46 Misc. 93, 91 N.Y.S. 276 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
39 220 Pa. 21, 68 A. 955 (1908) ; Annot., 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1266 (1909).
411 U11.LA. § 132 provides:
"The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the
order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawee.
It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means
than by the payment of money."
41 117 Wis. 589, 94 N.W. 572 (1903).
32 78 Ark. 490, 95 S.W. 804 (1906).
120
PAYOR BANK LIABILITY
interpreted section 137 of the U.N.I.A. as requiring action of a tortious
character which would constitute an unauthorized conversion of the item
by the drawee. The court said that since acceptance must be in writing,
under section 132 of the mere retention would not be sufficient
for acceptance.'" The different applications and interpretations of section
137 of the prevented the bank collection laws in this area from
being uniform.
Another attempt to codify the law regarding bank practices was the
Bank Collection Code which was drafted in the 1920's and enacted in a
number of states." This was the first comprehensive statute designed to
deal uniformly with the collection process. In 1948 the American Banking
Association drafted the Model Deferred Posting Statute as an amendment
to section 3 of the Bank Collection Code. 45 This statute provided that the
payee has until midnight of the following banking day to dishonor or refuse
payment on the item." Under the Deferred Posting Statute, final payment
should take place at the expiration of the time limit for return, and if pay-
ment takes place the payor bank is liable on the item. 47 As such this statute
is the forerunner of section 4-302 of the Code. The Bank Collection Code
was not adopted in many states, in part because of a decision of the
43 Britton, supra note 31, at 831 presents an argument, based on section 150 of the
U.N.I.A., that inaction is not acceptance. U.N.I.A. § 150 provides: "Where a bill is duly
presented for acceptance and is not accepted within the prescribed time, the person pre-
senting it must treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance or he loses the right of
recourse against the drawer and indorsers." Thus, Britton argues that a non-acceptance
should be treated as dishonored after the running of 24 hours. Britton in this section does
not say what recourse the payee has and against whom it will lie. This argument was not
considered in either the W estberg or the St. Louis case.
44 The Bank Collection Code was enacted in the following states: Alaska, Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. H. Bailey, supra note 32, at 5-6 n.14.
46
 T. Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions, Collections § 27 (Supp. 1966).
46 The Model Deferred Posting Statute provides:
"[A]ny credit so given, together with all related entries on the books of the receiv-
ing bank, may be revoked by returning the item, or if the item is held for protest
or at the time is lost or is not in the possession of the bank, by giving written
notice of dishonor, nonpayment, or revocation; provided that such item or notice
is dispatched in the mails or by other expeditious means not later than midnight
of the bank's next business day after the item was received. For the purpose of
determining when notice of dishonor must be given or protest made under the
law relative to negotiable instruments, an item duly presented, credit for which
is revoked as authorized by this Act shall be deemed dishonored on the day the
item or notice is dispatched.. . ."
Paton,' supra note 45.
47 In First Nat'l Bank v, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 132 Ind. App. 353, 170
N.E.2d 238 (1960), the court held the payor bank liable under the Model Deferred
Posting Statute when it retained an item for five days without charging the drawer's
account. The court held that, since the payor bank did not revoke the credit given
to the collecting bank within the time allowed under this statute, the credit became
irrevocable. The court held that failure to revoke the credit constitutes final pay-
ment. This is one of the few cases on the subject. In the opinion the court notes that
"extended independent research has failed to produce for us a case on the precise ques-
tion now considered." Id. at 363, 170 N.E.2d at 243.
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nois Supreme Court holding the Bank Collection Code unconstitutional in
Illinois.48
In 1949 the first proposed draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was
published. There have been three changes in the provisions of section 4-302
of the Code. In the 1949 draft, the provisions which were in section 3-629(2)
allowed the customer of the depositary bank to recover as if he were a
depositor in the payor bank. Their purpose was to secure the preferences
upon insolvency granted under some state laws and to give the benefit of
depositor insurance. In the 1950 draft, section 4-402, the provision allowing
the customer of the depositary bank to recover as if a depositor in the
payor bank, remained, but the present provision pertaining to presentment
warranty was added. In section 4-302 of the 1952 version, the provision
allowing recovery as if a depositor was dropped, but the Code still allowed
only the customer of the depositary bank to recover. The New York Com-
mission studying the Code noted the error of restricting recovery to the
customer of the depositary bank. As they stated, it is possible that the
customer of the depositary bank may no longer be the owner of the item
and as such should not be the party to recover in that he would have sold
his interest in the item.4° In 1958 section 4-302 of the Code was changed
to its present form making no mention of who can recover but merely
saying that the payor bank is accountable. Section 4-302 reaches the same
result as the majority view of the U.N.I.A. and the American Banking Asso-
ciation Model Deferred Posting Statute, but it is different in its approach
and method. Section 4-302 substitutes the theory of "accountability" for
that of "acceptance." Section 4-302 holds the payor bank accountable on
the item while section 137 of the U.N.I.A. held the payor bank as accepting
the item. Under the Model Deferred Posting Statute, the payor bank's
liability was not spelled out but was inferred from the fact that as the time
limit expired the settlement became final. The approach and method of
section 4-302 5° and the meaning of the word "accountable" can be seen
by its application in the two cases that have been decided under this
section.51
48 People ex rel. Barrett v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 362 Ill. 164, 199 N.E. 272 (1935)
held that section 13 of the Bank Collection Code, which gives preferred claims against
banks that have drawn drafts and checks instead of paying in cash on items presented by
an agent collecting bank and who have failed to pay on the draft, was unconstitutional
under the Illinois Constitution. The court held also that since the entire act was "essentially
and inseparably" connected iii substance the whole act was unconstitutional.
49 2 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code 1452 (1955).
5° Section 4-302 is to be read in conjunction with §§ 4-213(1) (d) and 4-301; which
establish when an item is finally paid. By § 4-213(1)(d) an item is finally paid when a
payor bank has failed to revoke the settlement in the time and manner prescribed by
statute, clearing house rules or agreement. § 4-301 establishes this time and manner. If
the item is finally paid it cannot be revoked and the payor bank is "accountable" on it.
§ 4-302 spells this out specifically and thus prevents the state courts from giving another
interpretation to this section as was the case with § 137 of the U.N.I.A.
51 The two cases decided under § 4-302 were concerned only with subsection (a).
Subsection (b) differs from (a) in that it does not exclude documentary drafts from its
provisions. Another difference is that for subsection (b) to apply the item must be properly
122
PAYOR BANK LIABILITY
In Rock Island Auction Sales v. Empire Packing Co." the court held
a payor bank, which had retained a check for seven days, accountable for
the full amount of the check. The payor bank had retained the item relying
on the drawer's assertion that he would deposit funds to cover the check.
The drawer did not deposit these funds and the check was returned unpaid.
Two and a half months later the drawer went into bankruptcy. The payee
thus sued the payor bank. The court interpreted "accountable" as synon-
ymous with "liable." The court held the payor bank liable for the full
amount of the check, rejecting the defendant payor bank's argument that
the measure of damages should be the same as that provided for by section
4-103(5) 53 of the Code. The defendant argued that the measure of damages
should be the amount of the item reduced by the amount that would not
have been paid by the payor bank had it exercised ordinary care. This in
effect is the amount that would have been paid had the bank exercised
ordinary care. The amount of the check was $14,706.90 and had the payor
bank exercised ordinary care it would have dishonored and returned it since
the drawer had insufficient funds. Thus, the amount that would not have
been paid was $14,706.90. By the defendant's argument, in applying section
4-103(5), the payor bank would have been liable for the amount of the
item minus that which would not have been paid; this net amount would be
zero. The court rejected this argument and held that the payor bank was
liable for the full amount of the item. It stated that the measure of damages
in section 4-103(5) should apply only to collecting banks whose mistakes
could be attributed to negligence. Because of the customer relationship
between the payor bank and the drawer, failure of the payor bank to take
timely action is often due to a purposeful effort to protect the drawer's
credit. This is a laudable purpose but the effect is harmful to the payee, in
that the payment is delayed, and if the item was dishonored after a delay
the payee would be slow in taking action against the drawer. The court also
mentioned that the role of the payor bank is crucial in that it knows the
status of its customer's account and thus the worth of the item. Therefore,
section 4-302 does not operate with respect to ordinary care but imposes
a liability for breach of its provisions whether or not the payor bank exercised
ordinary care. In Farmer's Cooperative Livestock Market v. Second Nat'l
payable. Subsection (b) states that the payor bank is accountable for properly payable
items unless "within the time allowed for acceptance or payment of that item the bank
either accepts or pays the item or returns it and accompanying documents." The phrase
"within the time allowed" does not refer to § 4-301 for that section, like § 4-302(a), is
concerned only with demand items other than documentary drafts. The "time allowed"
refers to § 3-506 which states the time for acceptance or payment for all instruments ex-
cept drafts drawn under a letter of credit. For letters of credit the time limits for honor
or rejection are stated in § 5-112.
52 32 Ill. 2d 269, 204 N.E.2d 721 (1965).
53 	§ 4-103(5) provides: "The measure of damages for failure to exercise
ordinary care in handling an item is the amount of the item reduced by an amount
which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care, and where there is bad
faith it includes other damages, if any, suffered by the party as a proximate conse-
quence."
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Bank" the court also held the payor bank liable to the payee and inter-
preted section 4-302 in the same manner as did Rock Island:'5
A realistic reading of this statute [section 4-302] compels the
conclusion that failure to meet the midnight deadline authorizes
the person presenting the check to assume that it has been honored
and will be paid. Banking practices require the prompt settlement
of such items because of the chain of credit dependent thereon."
For the purpose of evaluating the operation of section 4-302 certain
facts concerning banking collection codes and banking practices must be
considered. The American banking community needs laws that will 'facilitate
the smooth and rapid handling of checks. One objective is to reduce the
amount of funds involved in "float" items." These are the items that are
currently in transit in the collection system. The more rapid the collection
system, the fewer items will be tied up in float. Another consideration is
that of the huge volume of checks handled in the United States. Those which
are initially dishonored appear to be about 1/8%; 991/2% by number and
99 3/4 % by dollar value are paid in due course, 1/2 of which are paid on
representation." This large volume of checks processed should not be
held up by the small percentage in the area of risk. Also, a general principle
of a bank collection code is that it makes an equitable and fair allocation of
losses so that no great burden is placed on any one bank.
Section 4-302 requires the payor bank to decide rapidly whether to
honor an item. The result is that the owner of an item may not be best
served if a payor bank rejects the item too quickly' If the payor bank
were able to wait for the item to be covered it might not only protect the
drawer's credit but also prevent the additional paper work caused by a
rejection and the additional work by the payee to collect on the item. Of
the items dishonored one-half are paid on representation"" and more are paid
in cash outside of banking circles.
Section 4-401°' allows the payor bank to charge to the account of the
drawer any otherwise properly payable item even though the charge creates
an overdraft. Thus, if the payor bank receives an item and the drawer has
insufficient funds, the payor bank may pay the item and hold the drawer for
54 427 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1968).
55 The Farmer's case also involved an issue as to whether the instrument was a
demand item and the bank a collecting bank. The court held that since the item was
payable on demand it was a demand item in reference to § 4-302(a). The court held also
that since the item was drawn on the bank it was a payor bank and not a collecting
bank.
56 427 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Ky. 1968).
57 King, Kuenzel, Lauer, Littlefield & Stone, Cases and Materials on Commercial
Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code 11-46 (1968).
58
 Leary, supra note 2, at 333.
59
 This idea is mentioned in U.C.C. § 4-211, Comment 6. In this context it refers
to a collecting bank rejecting an item, but the idea can also be applied to § 4-302 and
payor banks.
Leary, supra note 2, at 333. See also note 4 supra.
61 U.C.C. § 4-401(1) provides: "As against its customer, a bank may charge against
his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account even though
the charge creates an overdraft."
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the amount of the item since the draft itself authorizes the payment for the
drawer's account and carries an implied promise to reimburse the drawee. 62
In this case the payee would be well served, since the item would be honored,
the drawer's credit would be protected and the payor bank would be able
to collect on the item from the drawer. The real problem is that the payor
bank often cannot recover from the drawer because the drawer has absconded,
has gone into bankruptcy or has no available assets." In these cases the
payor bank would bear the loss for it would be too late to revoke the settle-
ment and therefore it could not collect from the payee. Since the payor bank
does not always know the drawer's financial condition or intention, if there is
a risk of large loss, the payor bank would be hesitant to pay on the item and
charge the drawer's account. For these reasons, even with the provision of
section 4-401, the payor bank would often reject items that may have been
covered by the drawer.
The Code could be adapted to meet this problem by the addition of a
provision similar to that of section 4-108(1), 64 but made applicable to payor
banks. That section allows a collecting bank to grant a payor hank an extra
day in a good faith effort to secure payment. That section only applies in the
case of specific items°5 and it operates without liability to the transferor or any
prior party. The problem is that it rests with the collecting bank to grant
this extra time and that this process entails more transaction between the
collecting bank and the payor bank. This is an act of discretion on the part
of the collecting bank in that the collecting bank is under no obligation to
grant this extra time." A better provision would be to allow the payor bank
to set aside and record, for example on the back of the item, specific items
that the payor bank feels will be covered before an additional day expires.
The extra day could put a burden on the payee who is the owner of the
check, not on the payor bank, since the delay in the return of the check may
make it more difficult for the payee to collect because a delay in collecting
from the drawer may result in the availability of less funds. Since the payee
is the person who would profit by this provision, for it is an attempt to get
payment on a check that he holds, the risk of non-collection should lie most
appropriately on him. This allocation would not encumber the collecting
62 This is set out in Comment 1 to § 4-401.
63 In both the Rock Island and Farmer's cases it was the inability of the drawer to
cover the items and the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against the drawer which
forced the payee to go against the payor bank.
64 U.C.C. § 4-108(1) provides:
Unless otherwise instructed, a collecting bank in a good faith effort to secure
payment may, in the case of specific items and with or without the approval of
any person involved, waive, modify or extend the time limits imposed or per-
mitted by this Act for a period not in excess of an additional banking day with-
out discharge of secondary parties and without liability to its transferor or any
prior party.
05 By specific items it is meant that the payor bank would earmark these items and
process them separately. This procedure would insure that they be kept to a minimum
since these items would be specially handled outside the flow of checks and therefore
would require more work on the part of the payor bank.
66 It appears that the collecting bank is not required to grant this extra day. See
Brown, Bank Deposits and Collections, 48 Ky. L.J. 232, 243 (1960).
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banks with more transactions. The flow of items would remain unimpeded
and the amount of items in float would not be significantly increased .'or
this suggested provision would involve only the less than one half percent
of the items which would have been initially dishonored by the payor bank.
This process would allow the payor bank to differentiate between the various
items that are not properly payable: for example forged items, those signed
by a drawer who has no account in the bank and those partially covered.
The payor bank can then quickly return and dishonor those items which are
forged or signed by an unknown drawer. In situations where the payor bank
feels that the drawer may cover the item it could notify the drawer and give
him an extra day to cover the item. The interested parties are the payor bank,
the drawer and the payee. The collecting banks are conduits between the
payee and the payor bank. The collecting banks generally have little op-
portunity to learn of a drawer's insolvency, impending bankruptcy or forgery.
If an item were retained by the payor bank beyond the time limit of section
4-301 and less than the additional time limit of this proposed provision, the
payor bank would be accountable if it did not treat the item as a specific
item. This could easily be established by examination of the records of that
item, for instance those on the back of the check. This procedure would have
the same effect as section 4-108(1) for the item would be specially handled but
without the additional steps involved if the payor bank must request an addi-
tional day and the collecting bank must grant it. The general provision of
good faith°7
 would have to be relied upon so that the payor bank would not
treat all items as specific and thus give themselves an additional day for pay-
ment or dishonor.08
Section 4-302 of the Code effects the purpose for which it was proposed.
It aids the rapid processing of the voluminous amount of checks by requiring
the payor bank to take prompt action on a check. It corrects the problem of
judicial interpretation which resulted in the application of similar provisions
of the U.N.I.A. in a non-uniform manner. The one difficulty is that it allocates
the losses heavily on the payor bank so that they reject items that may have
been covered. As a result neither the payee nor the drawer is best served, since
the item owned by the payee is dishonored and the drawer's credit is hurt.
A better solution would be to have the item covered so that the payor bank
can honor it. The addition of a section allowing the payor bank, in a good
faith effort to secure payment, to retain the item for an extra day would
greatly alleviate the problem.
LAWRENCE J. BALL
67 U.C.C. § 1-203 establishes the general provision of good faith. That a bank can-
not disclaim this responsibility is established by U.C.C. § 4-103 (1) .
Gs As § 4-302 now stands, its provisions are somewhat mitigated by § 4-108(2) which
excuses delays beyond the time limit of § 4-302 if caused by interruption of "communica-
tion facilities, suspension of payments by another bank, war, emergency conditions or
other circumstances beyond the control of the bank... ." § 4-302 is also mitigated by
§ 4-103(1) which allows provisions of the Code to be varied by agreement.
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